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Abstract
In this paper we construct a new methodology to measure the international income
smoothing and present stronger connection between international asset holding and inter-
national income smoothing for OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we re-examine the ties between international portfolio allocation and income
smoothing. We propose a revised approach of measuring income smoothing via foreign asset
holdings that focuses on factor income inflows as opposed to the commonly used net factor
income in the literature mainly proposed by Sørensen et al. (2007). A compelling reason for
purely concentrating on factor income inflows is mainly that during recession periods wages,
interest, and profits tend to be lower and this may entail a reduction in outflows, consequently
an overestimation of net foreign factor income and its impact on income smoothing via inter-
national asset holdings. Using net factor income in our views carries the potential drawback
of producing higher (lower) smoothing than normal during recession (expansion). The factor
income inflow by contrast does not suffer from this shortcoming. Its movement or magni-
tude does not necessarily synchronize with fluctuations in domestic output. Since this paper’s
primary concern is to construct the strong tie with the international portfolio allocation and
international income smoothing, it is less likely to add factor outflows to get a valid estimation
of income smoothing via domestic investors’ international portfolio allocation.
Macroeconomic models are built on the central assumption that economic agents are either
rational or near-rational. Grubel (1968) explains investors’ rationale for holding internationally
diversified portfolio by looking at the mean-variance of both portfolios with purely domestic
assets and portfolios with a combination of domestic and foreign assets. He shows that the
mean-variance of the latter is smaller than the former. Lewis (1996 and 1999) substantiates
Grubel’s main findings by providing both theoretical foundation and empirical evidence. How-
ever, Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) have observed that investors in high income
countries do not hold foreign financial assets as much as they should optimally. A large portion
of their financial assets are from the domestic market, a behavior that is known as “home bias”.
Nevertheless, over the last decade, capital market integration has grown tremendously leading
to higher volumes of international assets trading across borders. This has led to a downward
trend in home bias levels, in particular among high-income OECD members. In aggregate
level data, Sørensen et al. (2007) have recently shown that there is a strong connection be-
tween the volume of cross-border assets holding and income smoothing. More intuitively, this
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implies that the more internationally diversified an investor’s portfolio is the higher possibility
to smooth income as they are able to switch income from the foreign markets to the domestic
market to keep their levels of consumption relatively stable over time at home.
2 Methodology
The literature on income smoothing via international asset holding suggests that investors
who diversify their portfolio enjoy income smoothing via their holding of international assets.
Therefore, foreign assets’ holding is equivalent to an insurance against economic downturns at
home. It is customary in the literature to use the difference between gross domestic product
(GDP) and gross national product (GNP) as a proxy of the amount of net income flows across
countries to gauge the extent of risk sharing across countries. That is:
GNP ≈ GDP +Rd ∗Ad −Rf ∗Af ,
where Af is the stock of domestic assets owned by foreign residents, Rf is the rate of return
on these assets, and Ad and Rd are the stock of and the return on domestically-owned foreign
assets, respectively.1
At the aggregate level, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) applied the following regression to
measure income smoothing via cross border asset holdings:
∆ log GDPit −∆ log GNPit = νf,t + βf ∆ log GDPit + i,t , (1)
where ∆ log GDP is the annual change in GDP per capita in constant prices and ∆ log GNP is the
annual change in GNP per capita in constant prices. When coefficient of βf is the coefficient
estimate that captures income smoothing from net factor income flows, νf,t and i,t are fixed
effect and error terms, respectively. A positive value of βf implies that net factor income from
abroad is not perfectly correlated with idiosyncratic output shocks; thereby offering some
income smoothing for the domestic output shocks. As βf approaches 1, the country under
consideration experiences greater income smoothing from international asset holdings.
1In fact this is only an approximate relationship between the GDP and GNP. However, we neglect the
remittances which is counted in GNP calculation. For detailed the formula you may check the U.N. Statistics
Database.
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Our approach for excluding the income outflows from the net factor income can be explained
by the fact that during recession(expansion) periods wages, interest, and profits tend to be
lower(higher) and this may entail a reduction(expansion) in outflows, consequently an overesti-
mation(underestimation) of net foreign factor income and its impact on income smoothing via
international asset holdings. Net factor income in our views carries the potential drawback of
producing higher(lower) smoothing than normal during recession(expansion). However, factor
income inflows are not be effected from those estimation biases. Therefore, we reconstruct this
methodology by proposing a measure of income that is reflective of purely international asset
holding earnings to capture income smoothing effectively.
Our model can be written as follows;
∆ log GDPinit −∆ log GDPit = νf,t + βf+ ∆ log GDPit + i,t , (2)
where GDPin is defined as GDP + factor income inflows. The structure of this equation
documents that we only consider the income inflows coming from abroad instead of the net
income flows.
3 Data
We use a broad sample of high-income OECD countries to investigate the relationship between
international portfolio allocation and income smoothing and test whether our innovation of
solely focusing on factor income inflow makes a difference to the existing literature.2 We ob-
tained a pair-wise volume of cross border equity holdings in US dollars from the International
Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS). Total market capitaliza-
tion of equity markets are obtained from the World Development Indicators Database. To
estimate the risk-sharing regressions, we gather national accounts data from OECD National
Accounts–Main Aggregates (Volume I) and detailed tables (Volume II) that cover the period
1970–2006.
2Data set include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Canada, Japan, Iceland Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, and US.
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We define “home portfolio bias” as the excessive investment in domestic portfolio compared
with the optimal amount of allocation of domestic portfolio that international CAPM model.
The home equity bias index is calculated as:
HOMEBIASit =
(1− F it )
(1−Dit)
. (3)
where F it is the foreign equity ratio in total equity portfolio of country i at time t. Total equity
portfolio of country i is equal to stock market capitalization + foreign equity held - amount
of country’s equity held by foreigners. Dit is a ratio of stock market capitalization of country
i to stock market capitalization of the world. Figure 1 contains the home bias levels of the
sample. We clearly observe gradual decrease in the home equity bias which is consistent with
the higher volume of foreign asset trading for the OECD members.
Figure 1 here
4 Empirical Findings
Table 1 shows both our innovation to focus on factor income inflows and the net factor income
flows. Both models report higher levels of income smoothing in the very last years which
is perfectly consistent with capital market integration. By looking at Figure 1, for the euro
members, since home equity bias levels are quite lower than non-EMU OECD members, we
shall expect higher level income smoothing via international asset holdings which is further
documented in Table 1.
We carry out a sensitivity analysis to determine whether the difference in the methodology
stands on firm grounds. We drop Ireland and Netherlands, which have the lowest home equity
bias levels among euro members from the sample.3 The results are reported in Table 2 with
3 panels. Panel A shows the results of the truncated sample defined above. It can be gleaned
that the coefficient of smoothing via factor income inflows, β+, decreases considerably in the
last two sub-periods whereas the net factor income smoothing, βf , does not change that much,
though we expected it to decrease also. The coefficients in the Panel A indicates that income
3Since it has negative level, Ireland’s home equity bias levels has not been reported in Figure 1.
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smoothing is much higher if we consider Ireland and the Netherlands which are the most
“open” countries across the Euro area.
In panel B of Table 2, we drop Greece, the member with the highest home equity bias level
among euro members, from the regression equation instead. Expectedly, the income smoothing
via factor income inflows increases from 12 % to 17 % and are statistically significant for the
last two sub-periods, whereas the former smoothing model does not have that sensitivity,
even it reacts in the opposite direction after we drop Greece. In Panel C of Table 3, we
performed a similar test for non-EU OECD members, by dropping Switzerland, having the
lowest home equity bias level among OECD-EU members, income smoothing through our
methodlogy decreases from 3 % to 2 % whereas regressions based up on the net income flows
does not show that level of sensitivity after dropping Switzerland.
This simulation demonstrates that a clear relationship between foreign equity holdings
and income smoothing via net factor inflows exists but the same cannot be said for net factor
income inflows. In light of these facts, and considering the genuine relationship between the
foreign asset holdings and income smoothing, we surmise that our approach of using factor
income inflows is superior to the existing net factor income approach in the literature to
measure income smoothing via capital markets across countries.
This paper has made a practical contribution to the literature in explaining the factors
underlying income smoothing. However, we have only considered the equity market and found
that it is the most significant factor. Also, considering recent literature to believe that interna-
tional debt securities’ trading does not have such power. This is consistent with recent studies
by Pagano (2004), Codogno et al.(2003), and Balli (2008). These authors find that there is a
high correlation between bond markets which restrains income smoothing.4
4Adjaout et al.(2002) concluded that since government bond yield differentials across euro region are in
very small amount and corporate bond returns are highly correlated, euro bond bias, which is very high across
OECD countries, does not create ample opportunity for income smoothing.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we present new empirical evidence on the linkages between international asset
trading and income smoothing. We have used factor income inflows instead of net factor
income that is common in the literature and found strong correlation between risk sharing and
international asset holdings. Our results are more robust compared to the previous literature
estimations.
7
References
Adjaout, K., Laura, B., Danthine, J., Fischer., A., Hamaui, R., and Portes, R. (2002) EMU and
portfolio adjustment. CEPR Policy Paper, No:5.
Ahearne, A., Griever, W., and Warnock, F.(2000) Information costs and home bias. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No:
691.
Balli, F. (2008) Spillover effects on government Bond yield spreads in Euro zone. Does perfect
integration exist among EMU members? Journal of Economics and Finance Forthcom-
ing.
Codogno, L., Favero, C., and Missale, A. (2003) EMU and government bond spreads, Eco-
nomic Policy, 18, 503–532.
French, K., and Poterba, J. (1991) International diversification and international equity mar-
kets. American Economic Review, 81, 222–226.
Grubel, H. L. (1968) Internationally diversified portfolios: welfare gains and capital flows.
American Economic Review, 58, 1299–1314.
Lewis, K. (1996) What explain the apparent lack of international consumption risk sharing?.
Journal of Political Economy, 104, 267–297.
Lewis, K. (1999) Trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 1999, 37, 571–608.
Pagano, M., and Von-Thadden, E. L. (2004) The European bond markets under EMU, Ox-
ford Review of Economic Policy, 20, 531-554.
Sørensen, B. E., Yosha, O. (1998) International risk sharing and European monetary unifica-
tion. Journal of International Economics,45, 211–38.
Sørensen, B. E., Wu, Y. T., Yosha, O., Zhu. Y. (2007) Home bias and international risk shar-
ing: Twin puzzles separated at birth. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26,
587—605.
Tesar, L., and Werner, I. (1995) Home bias and high turnover. Journal of International Money
and Finance, 14, 467–492.
8
Table 1: Income Smoothing (percent) via International Factor Income.
Panel A: OECD-EU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2006
βf+ –1.64 –0.52 2.32 2.96
(0.95) (0.94) (1.47) (2.66)
βf 1.41 –2.95 –1.98 2.26
(0.62) (1.42) (1.29) (2.93)
Panel B: EMU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2006
βf+ 0.43 –3.1 6.25 12.13
(0.91) (1.52) (2.06) (6.06)
βf -0.98 –2.01 4.61 9.47
(0.75) (1.93) (2.34) (2.52)
Notes.OECD–EU: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea Republic, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and US. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. We exclude Luxembourg, since it is an outlier with
its position. Percentages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in
brackets. The table shows, for incoming factor income, the coefficient βf+, the GLS estimate
of the slope in the regression of ∆ log(GDPi+ international factor income received)−∆ log GDPi
on ∆ log GDPi. The coefficient βf , is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
∆ log GDPi −∆ log GNPi on ∆ log GDPi.
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Table 2: Income Smoothing (percent) from International Factor Income.
Panel A: EMU without Ireland and Netherlands
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2006
βf+ 1.14 –4.04 0.57 4.87
(0.81) (1.81) (2.23) (5.82)
βf –1.23 –3.32 –0.3 8.48
(0.69) (1.75) (2.57) (2.63)
Panel B: EMU without Greece
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2006
βf+ 1.34 –2.03 7.31 17.06
(0.86) (1.77) (2.06) (6.86)
βf –1.64 –3.13 4.49 5.33
(0.77) (1.93) (2.41) (3.17)
Panel C: OECD-EU without Switzerland
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2006
βf+ –2.75 –3.61 1.16 1.63
(0.88) (1.42) (1.79) (1.94)
βf 0.83 –3.37 –3.13 2.11
(0.61) (0.92) (1.43) (3.46)
Notes.OECD–EU: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea Republic, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and US. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Percentages of shocks absorbed at each level of
smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. The table shows, for incoming factor income, the
coefficient βf+, the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log(GDP
i+ international
factor income received)−∆ log GDPi on ∆ log GDPi. The coefficient βf , is the GLS estimate of
the slope in the regression of ∆ log GDPi −∆ log GNPi on ∆ log GDPi.
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